Kriptografi Atasi Zarah Digital Signature (KAZ-SIGN)

Algorithm Specifications and Supporting Documentation

(Version 1.1)

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Table of Contents

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1. INTRODUCTION

The proposed KAZ Digital Signature scheme, KAZ-SIGN (in Malay *Kriptografi Atasi Zarah* - translated literally "cryptographic techniques overcoming particles"; particles here referring to the photons) is built upon the hard mathematical problem coined as the Modular Reduction Problem (MRP). The idea revolves around the difficulty of reconstructing an unknown parameter from a given modular reducted value of that parameter. The target of the KAZ-SIGN design is to be a quantum resistant digital signature candidate with short verification keys and signatures, verifying correctly approximately 100% of the time, based on simple mathematics, having fast execution time and a potential candidate for seamless drop-in replacement in current cryptographic software and hardware ecosystems.

2. THE DESIGN IDEALISME

(i) To be based upon a problem that could be proven analytically to require exponential time to be solved;

(ii) To be able to prove analytically that the cryptosystem is indeed resistant towards quantum computers;

(iii) To utilize problems mentioned in point (i) above in its full spectrum without having to induce "weaknesses" in order for a trapdoor to be constructed;

(iv) To use "simple" mathematics in order to achieve maximum simplicity in design, such that even practitioners with limited mathematical background will be able to understand the arithmetic;

(v) Achieve 128 and 256-bit security with key length roughly equivalent to the non-quantum secure Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC);

(vi) To achieve maximum speed upon having simplicity in design and short key length;

(vii) To have a sufficiently large signature space;

(viii) The computation overhead for both signing and verification increases slightly even if the key size increases in the future;

(ix) To be able to be mounted on hardware with ease;

(x) The plaintext to signature expansion ratio is kept to a minimum.

One of our key strategy to obtain items (i) - (v) was by utilizing our defined Modular Reduction Problem (MRP). It is defined in the following section.

3. MODULAR REDUCTION PROBLEM (MRP)

Let $N = \prod_{i=1}^{j} p_i$ be a composite number and $n = \ell(N)$. Let p_k be a factor of N. Choose $\alpha \in (2^{n-1}, N)$. Compute $A \equiv \alpha \pmod{p_k}$.

The MRP is, upon given the values (A, N, p_k), one is tasked to determine $\alpha \in (2^{n-1}, N)$.

4. COMPLEXITY OF SOLVING THE MRP

Let $n_{p_k} = \ell(p_k)$ be the bit length of p_k. The complexity to obtain α is $O(2^{n-n_{p_k}})$. When deploying Grover's algorithm on a quantum computer, the complexity to obtain α is $O(2^{\frac{n-n_{p_k}}{2}})$. In other words, if $p_k \approx N^{\delta}$, for some $\delta \in (0,1)$, the complexity to obtain α is $O(N^{1-\delta})$. When deploying Grover's algorithm on a quantum computer, the complexity to obtain α is $O(N^{\frac{1-\delta}{2}})$.

5. THE HIDDEN NUMBER PROBLEM (HNP) (Boneh and Venkatesan, 2001)

Fix p and u. Let $O_{\alpha,g}(x)$ be an oracle that upon input x computes the most u significant bits of $\alpha g^x \pmod{p}$. The task is to compute the hidden number $\alpha \pmod{p}$ in expected polynomial time when one is given access to the oracle $O_{\alpha,g}(x)$. Clearly, one wishes to solve the problem with as small u as possible. Boneh and Venkatesan (2001) demonstrated that a bounded number of most significant bits of a shared secret are as hard to compute as the entire secret itself.

The initial idea of introducing the HNP is to show that finding the u most significant bits of the shared key in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using users public key is equivalent with computing the entire shared secret key itself.

6. THE HERMANN MAY REMARKS (Herrmann and May, 2008)

We will now observe two remarks by Herrmann and May. It discusses the ability and inability to retrieve variables from a given modular multivariate linear equation. But before that we will put forward a famous theorem of Minkowski that relates the length of the shortest vector in a lattice to the determinant (see Hoffstein et al. (2008)).

Theorem 1. *In an ω-dimensional lattice, there exists a non-zero vector v with*

$$\|v\| \leq \sqrt{\omega}\, det(L)^{\frac{1}{\omega}}$$

In lattices with fixed dimension we can efficiently find a shortest vector, but for arbitrary dimensions, the problem of computing a shortest vector is known to be NP-hard under ran-

domized reductions (see Ajtai (1998)). The LLL algorithm, however, computes in polynomial time an approximation of the shortest vector, which is sufficient for many applications.

Remark 1. *Let $f(x_1,x_2,\ldots,x_k) = a_1x_1 + a_2x_2 + \ldots + a_kx_k$ be a linear polynomial. One can hope to solve the modular linear equation $f(x_1,x_2,\ldots,x_k) \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$, that is to be able to find the set of solutions $(y_1,y_2,\ldots,y_k) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^k$, when the product of the unknowns are smaller than the modulus. More precisely, let X_i be upper bounds such that $|y_i| \leq X_i$ for $1,\ldots,k$. Then one can roughly expect a unique solution whenever the condition $\prod_i X_i \leq N$ holds (see Herrmann and May (2008)). It is common knowledge that under the same condition $\prod_i X_i \leq N$ the unique solution $(y_1,y_2,\ldots,y_k)$ can heuristically be recovered by computing the shortest vector in an k-dimensional lattice by the LLL algorithm. In fact, this approach lies at the heart of many cryptographic results (see Bleichenbacher and May (2006); Girault et al. (1990) and Nguyen (2004)).*

We would like to provide the reader with the conjecture and remark given in Herrmann and May (2008).

Conjecture 1. *If in turn we have $\prod_i X_i \geq N^{1+\varepsilon}$ then the linear equation $f(x_1,x_2,\ldots,x_k) = \sum_{i=1}^{k} a_ix_i \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$ usually has N^{ε} many solutions, which is exponential in the bit-size of N.*

Remark 2. *From Conjecture 1, there is no hope to find efficient algorithms that in general improve on this bound, since one cannot even output all roots in polynomial time.*

7. THE KAZ-SIGN DIGITAL SIGNATURE ALGORITHM

7.1 Background

This section discusses the construction of the KAZ-SIGN scheme. We provide information regarding the key generation, signing and verification procedures. But first, we will put forward functions that we will utilize and the system parameters for all users.

7.2 Utilized Functions

Let $H(\cdot)$ be a hash function. Let $\mathrm{DLog}(\cdot)$ be the discrete anti-logarithm function. That is, from $g^x \equiv \beta \pmod{N}$, upon given (β,g,N) one computes $x = \mathrm{DLog}_g(\beta \pmod{N})$. Let $\phi(\cdot)$ be the usual Euler-totient function. Let $\ell(\cdot)$ be the function that outputs the bit length of a given input.

7.3 System Parameters

From the given security parameter k, determine parameter j. Next generate a list of the first j-primes larger than 2, $P = \{p_i\}_{i=1}^{j}$. Let $N = \prod_{i=1}^{j} p_i$. As an example, if $j = 43$, N is 256-bits. Let $n = \ell(N)$ be the bit length of N. Choose a random prime in $g \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ of order

G_g where at most $G_g \approx N^{\delta}$ for a chosen value of $\delta \in (0,1)$ and $\delta \to 0$. That is, $g^{G_g} \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$. Choose a random prime $R \in \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}$ of order G_R, where $G_R \approx \phi(N)^{\varepsilon}$ for $\varepsilon \to 1$. That is, choose R with a large order in $\mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}$. Let $n_{G_R} = \ell(G_R)$ be the bit length of G_R. Such R, has its own natural order in $Z_{\phi(G_g)}$. Let that order be denoted as G_{Rg}. We can observe the natural relation given by $R^{G_{Rg}} \equiv 1 \pmod{G_g}$ where $\phi(N) \equiv 0 \pmod{G_g}$ and $\phi(G_g) \equiv 0 \pmod{G_{Rg}}$. Let $n_{\phi(G_g)} = \ell(\phi(G_g))$ be the bit length of $\phi(G_g)$. The system parameters are $(g, n, n_{\phi(G_g)}, N, R, G_g, G_{Rg})$.

7.4 KAZ-SIGN Algorithms

The full algorithms of KAZ-SIGN are shown in Algorithms 1, 2, and 3.

Algorithm 1 KAZ-SIGN Key Generation Algorithm

Input: System parameters $(g, n, n_{\phi(G_g)}, N, R, G_g, G_{Rg})$
Output: Public verification key tuple, $V = (V_1, V_2, V_3)$, and private signing key, α

1: Choose random $\alpha \in (2^{n_{\phi(G_g)}-2}, 2^{n_{\phi(G_g)}-1})$.
2: Compute verification key, $V_1 \equiv \alpha \pmod{G_{Rg}}$.
3: Choose public verification key, V_2 a random k-bit prime, where k is the security parameter.
4: Compute public verification key, $V_3 \equiv \alpha \pmod{V_2}$.
5: Output public verification key tuple, $V = (V_1, V_2, V_3)$ and private signing key α.

Algorithm 2 KAZ-SIGN Signing Algorithm

Input: System parameters $(g, n, n_{\phi(G_g)}, N, R, G_g, G_{Rg})$, private signing key, α, and message to be signed, $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$
Output: Signature tuple, $S = (S_1, S_2, S_3)$.

1: Compute the hash value of the message, $h = H(m)$.
2: Choose random ephemeral prime $r \in (2^{n_{\phi(G_g)}-2}, 2^{n_{\phi(G_g)}-1})$.
3: Compute $S_1 \equiv R^{r \pmod{G_{Rg}}} \pmod{G_g}$.
4: Compute $S_2 \equiv (\alpha^{r \pmod{V_2}} + h) r^{-1} \pmod{G_{Rg} V_2}$.
5: Compute $S_3 \equiv r \pmod{V_2}$.
6: Output signature tuple, $S = (S_1, S_2, S_3)$, and destroy r.

Algorithm 3 KAZ-SIGN Verification Algorithm

Input: System parameters $(g, n, n_{\phi(G_g)}, N, R, G_g, G_{Rg})$, public verification key tuple, $V = (V_1, V_2, V_3)$, message, m, and, signature tuple, $S = (S_1, S_2, S_3)$.

Output: Accept or reject

1: Compute the hash value of the message to be verified, $h = H(m)$.
2: Compute $w_0 \equiv (S_2 S_3) - h \pmod{V_2}$.
3: Compute $w_1 \equiv V_3^{S_3} \pmod{V_2}$.
4: **if** $w_0 \neq w_1$ **then**
5: Reject signature $\perp$
6: **else** Continue step 8
7: **end if**
8: Compute $y_1 \equiv g^{S_1^{S_2} \pmod{G_g}} \pmod{N}$.
9: Compute $z_0 \equiv R^h \pmod{Gg}$.
10: Compute $z_1 \equiv R^{V_1^{S_3} \pmod{G_{Rg}}} \pmod{G_g}$.
11: Compute $y_2 \equiv g^{z_0 z_1} \pmod{N}$.
12: **if** $y_1 = y_2$ **then**
13: accept signature
14: **else** reject signature $\perp$
15: **end if**

Steps 2, 3, 4 and 5 during verification are known as the **KAZ-SIGN digital signature forgery detection procedure**.

8. THE DESIGN RATIONALE

8.1 Proof of correctness (Verification steps 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14)

We begin by discussing the rationale behind steps 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 with relation to the verification process. Observe the following,

$$g^{S_1^{S_2}} \equiv g^{R^{r(\alpha^{r \pmod{V_2}}+h)r^{-1}}} \equiv g^{R^{r(V_1^{S_3}+h)r^{-1}}} \equiv g^{R^{(V_1^{S_3}+h)}} \equiv g^{z_0 z_1} \pmod{N}.$$

As such the verification process does indeed provide an indication that the signature is indeed from an authorized sender with the private signing key α.

8.2 Proof of correctness (Verification steps 2, 3, 4 and 5: KAZ-SIGN digital signature forgery detection procedure)

In order to comprehend the rationale behind steps 2, 3, 4 and 5, one has to observe the following,

$$S_2S_3 - h \equiv V_3^{S_3} \pmod{V_2}.$$

Hence, $w_0 = w_1$.

8.3 Complexity of deriving forged signature tuple, (S_1, S_{2f}, S_{3f})

An adversary utilizing a random r constructs the corresponding S_1 and then computes $S_{2f} = (V_1^{r \pmod{V_2}} + h + G_{Rg}x)r^{-1} \pmod{G_{Rg}V_2}$ for the hash value of a message m that the adversary wishes to forge a signature upon it and a random $x \in \mathbb{Z}_{G_{Rg}}$, including $x = 0$. Observe that

$$g^{S_1^{S_{2f}}} \equiv g^{R^{r(V_1^{r \pmod{V_2}} + h + G_{Rg}x)r^{-1}}} \equiv g^{R^{r(V_1^{S_3} + h)r^{-1}}} \equiv g^{R^{(V_1^{S_3} + h)}} \equiv g^{z_0 z_1} \pmod{N}.$$

But before verification steps 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 are conducted, the verifier needs to execute verification steps 2, 3, 4 and 5.

Let $S_{3f} = r \pmod{V_2}$. The verifier will obtain

$$S_{2f}S_{3f} - h \equiv V_1^{r \pmod{V_2}} + G_{Rg}x \not\equiv V_3^{S_3} \pmod{V_2}.$$

For the above equation to hold, the adversary needs to identify S_{3f} satisfying

$$V_3^{S_{3f}} - S_{2f}S_{3f} + h \equiv 0 \pmod{V_2}.$$

Since,

$$S_{2f} = (V_1^{S_{3f}} + h + G_{Rg}x)S_{3f}^{-1} \pmod{G_{Rg}V_2}$$

this will imply,

$$V_3^{S_{3f}} - (V_1^{S_{3f}} + h + G_{Rg}x) + h \equiv 0 \pmod{V_2}$$

$$V_3^{S_{3f}} - V_1^{S_{3f}} - G_{Rg}x \equiv 0 \pmod{V_2}. \tag{1}$$

Then, upon obtaining S_{3f} we set

$$S_1 \equiv R^{S_{3f}} \pmod{G_g}.$$

We can then have

$$g^{S_1^{S_{2f}}} \equiv g^{R^{S_{3f}(V_1^{S_{3f}} + h + G_{Rg}x)S_{3f}^{-1}}} \equiv g^{R^{(V_1^{S_{3f}} + h + G_{Rg}x)}} \equiv g^{R^{(V_1^{S_{3f}} + h)}} \equiv g^{z_0 z_1} \pmod{N}.$$

However, to solve equation (1), the complexity is $O(V_2)$. When deploying Grover's algorithm on a quantum computer, the complexity will be $O(V_2^{\frac{1}{2}})$. Furthermore, V_2 is a prime number and the adversary will not be able to execute the Chinese Remainder Theorem to reduce this complexity.

8.4 Modular linear equation of S_2.

Let G_{Rg} be the order of R in $\mathbb{Z}_{G_g}$ where $R^{G_{Rg}} \equiv 1 \pmod{G_g}$.

We continue this direction by obtaining $r_0 \equiv (V_1^{r \pmod{V_2}} + h)S_2^{-1} \pmod{G_{Rg}}$.

From the above, observe that one can analyze S_2 as follows,

$$S_2 \equiv (\alpha^{r \pmod{V_2}} + h)r^{-1} \equiv (V_1 + h)r_0^{-1} \pmod{G_{Rg}}$$

which implies

$$r_0\alpha^{r \pmod{V_2}} - (V_1 + h)r + hr_0 \equiv 0 \pmod{G_{Rg}}. \tag{2}$$

Let $\hat{\alpha}$ be the upper bound for $\alpha^{r \pmod{V_2}}$ and $\hat{r}$ be the upper bound for r. From Conjecture 1, if one has the situation where $\hat{\alpha}\hat{r} \gg G_{Rg}$, then there is no efficient algorithm to output all the roots of equation (2). That is, equation (2) usually has G_{Rg} many solutions, which is exponential in the bit-size of G_{Rg}.

To this end, since $\alpha^{r \pmod{V_2}}$ is exponentially large, it is clear to conclude that $\hat{\alpha}\hat{r} \gg G_{Rg}$. This implies, there is no efficient algorithm to output all the roots of equation (2).

8.5 Implementation of the Hidden Number Problem

From S_2 to obtain α or r, is the hidden number problem.

9. ANOTHER "EXPENSIVE" PROBLEM RELATED TO KAZ-SIGN: THE SECOND ORDER DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM (2-DLP)

Let N be a composite number, g a random prime in $\mathbb{Z}_N$ of order G_g where at most $G_g \approx N^{\delta}$ for $\delta \in (0,1)$ and $\delta \to 0$. That is, $g^{Gg} \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$. Choose a random prime $Q \in \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}$ of order G_Q, where $G_Q \approx \phi(N)^{\varepsilon}$ for $\varepsilon \to 1$. That is, choose Q with a large order in $Z_{\phi(N)}$. Such Q, has it own natural order in $Z_{\phi(G_g)}$. Let that order be denoted as G_{Qg}. We can observe the natural relation given by $Q^{G_{Qg}} \equiv 1 \pmod{G_g}$ and $\phi(N) \equiv 0 \pmod{G_g}$.

Then choose a random integer $x \in \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(G_g)}$ where $x \approx \phi(G_g)$. Suppose from the relation given by

$$g^{Q^x \pmod{\phi(N)}} \equiv A \pmod{N} \tag{3}$$

one has solved the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) upon equation (3) in polynomial time on a classical computer and obtained the value X where $Q^x \not\equiv X \pmod{\phi(N)}$ and $g^X \equiv A \pmod{N}$, The relation $Q^x \not\equiv X \pmod{\phi(N)}$ would result in the non-existence of

the discrete logarithm solution for $Q^x \equiv X \pmod{\phi(N)}$.

The 2-DLP is, upon given the values (A, g, N, Q), one is tasked to determine $x \in \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(G_g)}$ where $x \approx \phi(G_g)$ such that equation (3) holds.

Let $Q^x \equiv T_1 \pmod{\phi(N)}$. From the predetermined order of $g \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, during the process of solving the DLP upon equation (3), a collision would occur prior to the full cycle of g. As such, the process of solving the DLP upon equation (3) to obtain $X \approx N^{\delta}$ would occur in polynomial time on a classical computer. And since $T_1 < \phi(N)$ and $T_1 \approx N_1$, the relation $Q^x \not\equiv X \pmod{\phi(N)}$ will hold.

Furthering on the discussion, one has the relation $g^{G_g} \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$. As such, from the value $X < G_g$ obtained from equation (3), one can construct the set of solutions given by $T_0 = X + G_g t$ for $t = 0, 1, 2, 3, \ldots$. Now let $Q^x \equiv T_1 \pmod{\phi(N)}$. Following through,since T_1 is an element from the set of solutions, one can have the relation

$$t_{T_1} = \frac{T_1 - X}{G_g}$$

Since $G_g, X \approx N^{\delta}$, and $\phi(N) \approx N$, the complexity to obtain T_t is $O(N^{1-\delta})$. When deploying Grover's algorithm on a quantum computer, the complexity to obtain t_{T_1} is $O(N^{\frac{1-\delta}{2}})$.

To this end, note that if one proceeds to solve the DLP upon $Q^x \equiv X \pmod{G_g}$, one can obtain the value $x_0 \equiv x \pmod{G_{Qg}}$. From the preceding sections, this is in fact the MRP. It is easy to see that with correct choice of parameters (x, G_{Qg}), the complexity of 2-DLP and MRP can be made the same. Hence, a more "non-expensive" method in discussing the needs of the KAZ-SIGN is directly via the MRP.

10. KEY GENERATION, SIGNING AND VERIFICATION TIME COMPLEXITY

It is obvious that the time complexity for all three procedures is in polynomial time.

11. SPECIFICATION OF KAZ-SIGN

The following is the security specification for $\delta = 0.3$.

Number of primes in P, j	$n = \ell(N)$	Total security level, k
126	980	128
199	1703	192
257	2311	256

Table 1

12. IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE

12.1 Key Generation, Signing and Verification Time Complexity

It is obvious that the time complexity for all three procedures is in polynomial time.

12.2 Parameter sizes

We provide here information on size of the key and signature based on security level information from Table 1 (for $\delta = 0.3$).

NIST Security Level	Number of primes in P, j	Security level, k	Length of parameter N (bits)	Public key size, (V_1, V_2, V_3, N) (bits)	Private key size, α	Signature Size (S_1, S_2, S_3) (bits)	ECC key size
1	126	128	980	≈ 1315	≈ 257	≈ 595	256
3	199	192	1703	≈ 2190	≈ 385	≈ 870	384
5	257	256	2311	≈ 2970	≈ 520	≈ 1180	521

Table 2

In the direction of the research, we also make comparison to ECC key length for the three NIST security levels. KAZ-SIGN key length did not achieve its immediate target of having approximately the same key length as ECC, but further research might find means and ways.

12.3 Key Generation, Signing and Verification Ease of Implementation

The algebraic structure of KAZ-SIGN has an abundance of programming libraries available to be utilized. Among them are:

1. GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library (GMP); and
2. Standard C libraries.

12.4 Key Generation, Signing and Verification Empirical Performance Data

In order to obtain benchmarks, we evaluate our reference implementation on a machine using GCC Compiler Version 6.3.0 (MinGW.org GCC-6.3.0-1) on Windows 10 Pro, Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4710HQ CPU @ 2.50GHz and 8.00 GB RAM (64-bit operating system, x64-based processor).

We have the following empirical results when conducting 100 key generations, 100 signings and 100 verifications:

Security level	Time (ms)		
	Key generation	Signing	Verification
128 - KAZ980	240	210	65
192 - KAZ1703	258	287	201
256 - KAZ2311	280	583	465

Table 3

13. ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS

As we have seen, KAZ-SIGN can be evaluated through:

1. Key length
2. Speed
3. No verification failure

13.1 Key Length

KAZ-SIGN key length is comparable to non-post quantum algorithms such as ECC and RSA. For 256-bit security, the KAZ-SIGN key size is 2311-bits. ECC would use 521-bit keys and RSA would use 15360-bit keys.

13.2 Speed

KAZ-SIGN's speed analysis results stem from the fact that it has short key length to achieve 256-bit security plus its textbook complexity running time for both signing and verifying is $O(n^3)$ where parameter n here is the input length.

13.3 No verification failure

It is apparent that the execution of **KAZ-SIGN digital signature forgery detection procedure** within the verification procedure will enable the verification computational process by the recipient to verify or reject a digital signature that was received by the recipient with probability equal to 1. That is, the probability of verification failure is 0.

13.4 Limitation

As we have seen, limitation of KAZ-SIGN can be evaluated through:

1. Based on unknown problem, the Modular Reduction Problem (MRP)

13.4.1 Based on unknown problem, the Modular Reduction Problem (MRP)

The MRP is not a known hard mathematical problem which is quantum resistant and is subject to future cryptanalysis success in solving the defined challenge either with a classical or quantum computer.

14. CLOSING REMARKS

The KAZ-SIGN digital signature exhibits properties that might result in it being a desirable post quantum signature scheme. In the event that new forgery methodologies are found, as long as the procedure can also be done by the verifier, then one can add the new forgery methodology into the verification procedure. At the same time, the same forgery methodology can be inserted into the signing procedure in order to eliminate any chances the signer will produce a signature that will be rejected.

To this end, the security of the MRP is an unknown fact. We opine that, the acceptance of MRP as a potential quantum resistant hard mathematical problem will come hand in hand with a secure cryptosystem designed upon it. We welcome all comments on the KAZ-SIGN digital signature, either findings that nullify its suitability as a post quantum digital signature scheme or findings that could enhance its deployment and use case in the future.

Finally, we would like to put forward our heartfelt thanks to Prof. Dr. Abderrahmane Nitaj from Laboratoire de Mathématiques Nicolas Oresme, Université de Caen Basse Normandie, France for insights, comments, and friendship throughout the process.

15. ILLUSTRATIVE FULL SIZE TEST VECTORS

The following are parameters that illustrate KAZ-SIGN for 128-bit security (refer to Table 2). This is an example for $j = 126$. That is, $P = \{3,5,7,\ldots,709\}$. We provide a valid KAZ-SIGN signature tuple $S = (S_1, S_2, S_3)$ and a forged KAZ-SIGN signature tuple $S = (S_1, S_{2f}, S_3)$.

N :
690132555335590126817202515306668149632498182811495743152929007107130524121540897496105226581967569096078228693285624538178461418814783090738519509475256851584639095976385664268727008220428563902784158579651008511656404323238798726027319340332200554552349605425483098493039238650551327456488093 5 $\approx 2^{980}$

g :
654596421644977622688807713843609869382444301979081574126669581501650045194537095870138878831160080922713850395256812334956794316286182314634828887573764261175346542069552709709412748896511274963421591151844268956054693027416968311322517559707682232602581231573712771441793343688827764663535 5107

G_g :
292506346968124494243492441527695709173835011585014574623782027831738093265600 0 $\approx 2^{161} \approx 2^{0.27(980)} \approx N^{0.3}$

R :
795071158544042812434082981010674972983969807675846717608519043115787367890943551710868544714306277924294372990483859353533845705217475797540942681149341009449226190544557389120193096331542992030179660780088650244592983098818328849142382119631854931360555293668331791003605817049980464003614819

G_{Rg} :
8483566886286446354400 $\approx 2^{73} \approx N^{0.074}$

α :
1877968724215609167738608034408540397908232044378195738307499372628363667885 49 $\approx 2^{257}$

V_1 :
6485464545684162807749

V_2 :
344569676565636603571053677181703691333 $\approx 2^{129}$

V_3 :
162838652097292836550730620429103925704

$t_{\alpha V_1} = \dfrac{\alpha - V_1}{G_{Rg}}$:
221365464478309983050298478178422250845934455909414456 32 $\approx 2^{184}$

$t_{\alpha V_3} = \dfrac{\alpha - V_3}{V_2}$:
5450185700998205770708797448826148214 65 $\approx 2^{129}$

h :
8956009536454109390102281835004599428882998473724974383344626894906341947849 4

r :
1603556971103896918252884498860801990793892284790095798246239317930355113082 51

S_1 :
1138495449613161390658013087766166758078233997305188988876398113685439812971 67

S_2 :
97615573766589222599115142112031726579779671346675723213019 3

S_3 :
76802956395063616687958238008214787463

S_{2f} :
1140462287203724179341219438955137663839920744513486157661 93

x :
352195511558688230942459701925619087211330155900450014416755865071565163913293217404098572019288055606123697619305801592282493294826352523495319546712977 20

w_0 for valid signature :
18621735444004786532847717571638163095 1

w_1 for valid signature :
18621735444004786532847717571638163095 1

w_0 for forged signature :
23095408262924148071841159293134682578 2

w_1 for forged signature :
18621735444004786532847717571638163095 1

y_1 and y_2 :
5110511444259610569581606199110224524353868509126947790802424576580538845372066074076545184116898463332350930607171707507694320191739167225204825724296778136257812679207760574142194087858208587262276387076561739431085344195849905166539833680426132953454458127598259077413388266014906546054505 23

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